martedì 20 novembre 2012

Shadow Banking System

Quando alla luce diventa difficile operare in tranquillità ... ci si sposta  dov'è più buio....

Che cos'è lo shadow banking ?

Lo shadow banking system (SBS) è rappresentato da tutti quegli istituti che NON sono banche (e per questo non soggette alla regolamentazione bancaria) ma svolgono attività di intermediazione finanziaria.
(Hedge fund, money market fund, Structured investment veichle in generale)

Per cui.... faccio quello che mi pare senza che nessuno mi regoli.

Ma quanto è grande questo sistema ?

non tanto.... solo un 70 trilioni $ circa....pari al prodotto interno lordo del mondo intero.

e in Europa ?

beh alla fine del 2011 per 20 euronazioni l'SBS rappresentava il 111% del Pil...



Queste entità non regolamentate hanno rappresentato (e rappresentano) un rischio paragonabile ad una bomba....

Nella crisi del 2007-08 lo shadow banking è stato tra i primi indiziati nell'espansione del credito che ha collassato il sistema.

Ovviamente parti dell'SBS continuano ad essere (salvate con i soldi dei cittadini se necessario) ma non regolamentate.


Contribution to the 2007–2012 financial crisis

The shadow banking system has been implicated as significantly contributing to the global financial crisis of 2007–2012. In a June 2008 speech, U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, then President and CEO of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, placed significant blame for the freezing of credit markets on a "run" on the entities in the shadow banking system by their counterparties. The rapid increase of the dependency of bank and non-bank financial institutions on the use of these off-balance sheet entities to fund investment strategies had made them critical to the credit markets underpinning the financial system as a whole, despite their existence in the shadows, outside of the regulatory controls governing commercial banking activity. Furthermore, these entities were vulnerable because they borrowed short-term in liquid markets to purchase long-term, illiquid and risky assets. This meant that disruptions in credit markets would make them subject to rapid deleveraging, selling their long-term assets at depressed prices.
Economist Paul Krugman described the run on the shadow banking system as the "core of what happened" to cause the crisis. "As the shadow banking system expanded to rival or even surpass conventional banking in importance, politicians and government officials should have realized that they were re-creating the kind of financial vulnerability that made the Great Depression possible—and they should have responded by extending regulations and the financial safety net to cover these new institutions. Influential figures should have proclaimed a simple rule: anything that does what a bank does, anything that has to be rescued in crises the way banks are, should be regulated like a bank." He referred to this lack of controls as "malign neglect."


Il mercato delle securatizzazioni durante la crisi