Alternative Title:
The European Commission: Democratic Deficit and the Illusion of Accountability
The European Union (EU) is often hailed as a triumph of liberal democracy, a voluntary union of nations committed to shared prosperity and peace. Yet beneath its veneer of consensus-driven governance lies a growing democratic deficit, epitomized by the European Commission—an institution that increasingly resembles an unaccountable technocracy rather than a body rooted in the will of the people. From its origins as a modest administrative arm to its current status as a political powerhouse, the Commission’s evolution raises urgent questions about who holds power in Europe and why voters feel increasingly powerless to influence it.
From Humble Beginnings to Unchecked Power
The European Commission was conceived in 1957 as part of the Treaty of Rome, tasked with impartially overseeing the implementation of European agreements. Its role was technocratic: to propose laws, manage EU funds, and enforce treaties. Over decades, however, successive treaties—Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon—expanded its authority far beyond mere administration. Today, the Commission wields exclusive legislative initiative, meaning it alone drafts EU laws, negotiates international agreements, and enforces compliance with EU rules. It operates as both the executive and the "guardian of the treaties," a role that grants it immense influence over the lives of 450 million Europeans.
Critically, the Commission is not directly elected. While the European Parliament (EP) approves its president and commissioners, these candidates are nominated by national governments, not voters. This creates a chasm between citizens and the EU’s most powerful institution. Unlike national governments, which can be ousted at the ballot box, the Commission’s leadership is effectively insulated from direct public accountability.
The People Spoke—Then Were Ignored
The EU’s democratic deficit became glaringly obvious in 2005, when French and Dutch voters rejected the proposed European Constitution in referendums. The constitution aimed to centralize decision-making and expand EU authority, but voters feared losing national sovereignty and criticized its opaque, elite-driven vision. Rather than heed this backlash, EU leaders repackaged the constitution as the Lisbon Treaty—a nearly identical text—and ratified it in 2007 through parliamentary procedures, bypassing public votes.
This maneuver exposed a troubling pattern: when citizens dare to dissent, EU institutions sidestep democracy. The Lisbon Treaty further empowered the Commission and created roles like the unelected EU President, deepening the perception of a leadership class detached from voters. As former German Constitutional Court judge Udo Di Fabio warned, the EU risks becoming a "post-democratic exercise."
The 2004 Showdown: When Parliament Flexed Its Muscles—Briefly
One of the few instances where the European Parliament challenged the Commission’s authority occurred in 2004, when incoming Commission President José Manuel Barroso proposed his team of commissioners. Among them was the controversial Italian nominee, Rocco Buttiglione, whose conservative views on homosexuality and women’s rights sparked outrage among MEPs. The Parliament, for the first time in EU history, threatened to reject the entire Commission unless changes were made.
Under pressure, Barroso withdrew his initial proposal and replaced Buttiglione, along with two other commissioners deemed unfit. The episode was hailed as a victory for parliamentary oversight. However, the aftermath revealed a subtler erosion of democratic checks. To avoid future confrontations, the Commission and member states quietly tightened control over the nomination process. National governments began vetting candidates more rigorously before their names reached Parliament, limiting MEPs’ ability to scrutinize or reject individual commissioners. While the Parliament retained its formal veto power, its practical influence was diluted.
This episode underscored a recurring dynamic: the EU’s power brokers tolerate parliamentary dissent only insofar as it doesn’t disrupt elite consensus. When the Parliament flexed its authority in 2004, the response was not to strengthen accountability but to streamline backroom deals, ensuring future Commissions would face less scrutiny. The Lisbon Treaty (2007) later formalized this shift by centralizing power in the hands of the European Council and Commission, further marginalizing the Parliament’s role.
The Illusion of Accountability
The 2004 crisis exemplifies the EU’s democratic contradictions. On paper, the Parliament holds a veto over the Commission—a democratic safeguard. In practice, the process is designed to minimize public accountability. Commissioners are still chosen by national governments, often as political favors, and the Parliament’s veto is a nuclear option too risky to deploy regularly. Even when MEPs forced changes in 2004, the Commission and Council ensured such defiance would not become routine.
This mirrors the Soviet Politburo’s approach to dissent: allowing occasional displays of opposition to maintain the façade of debate, while structurally entrenching elite control. The EU’s leadership, like the Politburo, operates within a closed system where power flows downward, not upward from voters.
The Politburo Parallel: Democracy Behind Closed Doors
The Commission’s lack of transparency invites comparisons to the Soviet-era Politburo, where a small cadre of elites made decisions with little public scrutiny. While the EU is not authoritarian, the analogy holds in one key respect: power is concentrated in bodies that operate beyond the reach of ordinary citizens.
Appointed, Not Elected: Commissioners are chosen through backroom deals among national leaders, not open elections. Once in office, they pledge loyalty to the EU, not their home countries.
No Mechanism for Removal: The EP can theoretically censure the Commission, but this requires a two-thirds majority—a near-impossible threshold. Voters have no direct way to "fire" the Commission.
Lobbyist Influence: Corporate and NGO lobbyists in Brussels outnumber MEPs 30-to-1, raising concerns that the Commission prioritizes special interests over public will.
Even the Spitzenkandidat system, introduced in 2014 to link the Commission president to EP elections, has been undermined. In 2019, EU leaders rejected the lead candidate from the largest parliamentary group, opting instead for Ursula von der Leyen—a compromise figure who had never campaigned for the role.
Locked in the Room of Power
The EU’s democratic structures are designed to give the illusion of participation. The EP, while elected, lacks the authority to initiate legislation, and voter turnout has plummeted from 62% in 1979 to 50.6% in 2019. Meanwhile, the European Council (heads of state) and Commission negotiate major policies behind closed doors, often disregarding dissenting voices. National referendums on EU matters are now avoided altogether, as seen with Brexit’s chaotic aftermath.
This insulation from accountability fosters resentment. Populist parties across Europe weaponize the EU’s remoteness, arguing—not without cause—that Brussels imposes policies (e.g., austerity, migration quotas) with no democratic mandate.
Conclusion: Reclaiming Democracy or Perpetuating the Gap?
The European Commission embodies a paradox: it is the engine of integration yet also the symbol of the EU’s democratic decay. To survive, the EU must confront its legitimacy crisis. Options include:
Direct Elections: Let voters choose the Commission president and commissioners.
Citizen Initiatives: Strengthen tools like the European Citizens’ Initiative to force legislative debates.
Transparency Reforms: End closed-door trilogues and publish all lobbying interactions.
Until then, the Commission risks becoming what its critics fear most: a modern-day Politburo, cloaked in democratic rhetoric but answerable only to itself. The lessons of 2004 and 2005 remains unlearned: democracy cannot thrive when institutions lock the people out of the room.
References:
The Lisbon Treaty (2007)
French/Dutch EU Constitution referendum results (2005)
European Parliament turnout data
"Post-Democracy" by Colin Crouch
2004 crisis: A democratic mirage