martedì 28 aprile 2026

"Sleep Well, European Partners": Russia Just Named Your Factory as a War Target




On 15 April 2026, the Russian Ministry of Defence published a list of European facilities it considers legitimate military targets. Four of them are in Italy. Not a single European government has called an emergency session.

We are being led into war. Not with a declaration, not with a parliamentary vote, not even with an honest public debate.

On 15 April 2026, the Russian Ministry of Defence published — via its official Telegram channel — a list of European facilities it considers part of Ukraine's military infrastructure. Drone factories. Component suppliers. Real addresses. Real buildings. On EU soil.

Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of Russia's Security Council, followed immediately on X:

"The list must be taken literally: the publication of production sites for drones and other military equipment in Europe is a register of potential legitimate targets for the Russian armed forces. Sleep well, European partners."

This is not a threat buried in a diplomatic communiqué. It is a public register of targets, published by a nuclear power, naming factories in Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Denmark, Lithuania, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom — and Italy.

And our governments said nothing....


The Official Russian Source

The original document was published on 15 April 2026 by the Russian Ministry of Defense via its official Telegram channel: Минобороны РФ Telegram Post.

The Russian Defense Ministry stated explicitly:

"The European public should not only clearly understand the true causes of threats to their security, but also know the addresses and locations of 'Ukrainian' and 'joint' enterprises for the production of UAVs and components for Ukraine on the territory of their countries."

This is not ambiguity. This is a deliberate, public communication to European citizens, over the heads of their governments, that their territory has been incorporated into an active war theatre — without their knowledge and without their consent.

Part I: 11 Ukrainian Branches Across Europe

Below is the full list of 11 Ukrainian manufacturing branches identified by the Russian Ministry of Defense, with their exact locations and the drone types they allegedly produce.

No. Company Name Country City / Address Drone Type(s) Produced
1 Fire Point United Kingdom Mildenhall, 2 West Row Road FP-1, FP-2
2 Horizon Tech United Kingdom London, 17 King Edward Street / Leicester, Meridian North Block, 5 Sticker
3 Da Vinci Avia Germany Munich, Felaskostrasse, 10 Da Vinci
4 Airlogics Germany Munich, Lerchenauerstrasse, 28 Anubis
5 Terminal Autonomy Latvia Riga, Latgales Street, 462 AQ-400 Kosa (Scythe)
6 Kort Denmark & Lithuania Støvring / Vilnius, Dariaus-ir-Girėno Street, 21A HaKi AK-1000
7 Destinus Netherlands Hengelo, Haaksbergerstraat 71 Ruta
8 Antonov State Enterprise Poland Mielec, Polish Army Street, 3 An-196 Lyuty
9 Ukrspecsystems Poland Tarnów, Jana Kochanowskiego Street, 30 RAM-2X
10 DeViRo Czech Republic Prague, Na Strži Street, 1702/65 & Kolin Bulava
11 [unnamed Lithuanian entity] Lithuania Vilnius area Various

Note on Airlogics: Some sources report that the Munich address corresponds to a residential building. The Russian list includes it regardless.

Part II: The 4 Italian Companies

Beyond the Ukrainian branches, Moscow has identified 10 foreign enterprises producing drone components for Ukraine. Four are Italian — all involved in engine production.

No. Company Name Location Alleged Role
1 CMD Avio Venice, Via dell'Artigianato 12 Piston engine production for drones
2 MVFY Garbagnate Milanese, Lombardy Aircraft engine production
3 EPA Power Omegna, Piedmont Light aviation engine production
4 Gilardoni Mandello del Lario, Lombardy Piston engine production for drones

Note on CMD Avio: The company's actual headquarters are in Potenza. The Venice address listed by Moscow is disputed. The listing stands regardless.

Six additional foreign enterprises from Israel, Turkey, Spain and other countries were also named, producing GNSS receivers, carbon fibre airframes, and optical systems.

Italy is not a neutral party in this conflict. It became a strategic rear — without a vote, without a debate, without a single Italian citizen being asked.

A Legitimate Target?

Here is the question no EU official will ask aloud:

If a country is at war and its weapons are produced on foreign soil, are those foreign production sites legitimate military targets?

Under international law, the answer is uncomfortable: objects that contribute directly to military action — including factories producing drones, ammunition, or components — can be attacked if they are not exclusively civilian in nature.

Russia has already answered the question for us. Medvedev did not publish a diplomatic protest. He published a targeting register and told us to sleep well.

No Democratic Consent

This is the core of the problem. Not a single European citizen has been asked whether we are willing to become a front-line military logistics hub.

The European Commission, the European Council, and the rotating presidencies operate with near-zero democratic accountability on foreign and defence policy. There are no referendums. No national ratification. No transparent red lines.

Instead, we were moved incrementally:

  • First, financial aid
  • Then, defensive weapons
  • Then, training missions
  • Then, hosting weapons production

At no point was the public asked: Are you willing to accept the risk of military retaliation on European soil?

The Escalation Trap

Once these factories are accepted as a legitimate part of Ukraine's war effort, the logic becomes automatic:

Russia strikes a drone production site in Poland, Italy, or the Czech Republic. The targeted country invokes NATO Article 5. The alliance is at war with Russia — not because a member state was invaded, but because a weapon factory was hit.

Who made that choice? Not the Polish, Italian, or Czech people. Not a pan-European democratic vote. A handful of unaccountable officials who never clearly explained that economic support had quietly become military hosting.

That is not leadership. That is a trap — and we are already inside it.

What Must Happen

  1. Full transparency — every EU citizen has the right to know exactly which facilities on their national territory are producing military equipment for a warring party
  2. Democratic consent — no hosting of weapons production or military infrastructure without a national or EU-wide mandate
  3. Red lines — our governments must define publicly what would constitute an unacceptable escalation and what would trigger direct involvement

Silence is complicity. Our institutions are choosing silence because debate would mean admitting they have already crossed the line without asking us.

We are no longer on the sidelines. We are the rear. And the first hits will come faster than anyone is willing to admit.

Sources:

Pubblicato da alle
Etichette: , , , , ,